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1 Executive Summary
This report is based on records collected by four sources investigating deaths
in the ongoing conflict in Syria (described below and in Appendix A). For the
period 15 March 2011 through 31 December 2015, we find a total of 12,270
documented, identifiable people killed while the victim was in detention.1
Using a statistical method called multiple systems estimation (MSE), we
calculate that an estimated total of 17,7232 victims, both documented and
undocumented were killed in detention during this time period. This implies
that overall approximately 25% of killings that occurred in detention during
this time were not documented by any of these four sources.
It is important to note that our estimate of 17,723 victims is likely to
be an under-estimate. This is due to decisions we made regarding what
constituted a killing that occurred in detention; this is described in more
detail in Section 7.
There have been other investigations into deaths in detention; a partic-
ularly well-known example is the 2014 Syrian detainee report, also known
as the Caesar Report. In Section 8, we describe why we believe that the
statistical findings of the Caesar Report overestimate deaths in detention.
The sections of this report represent the chronological steps in our anal-
ysis: receipt of data from our partner organizations, classifying killings that
occurred in detention, linking multiple records that refer to the same vic-
tim, imputing missing information about detention, and calculating MSE
estimates. We then close with a few sections reflecting on this and other
published estimates of deaths in detention. Several appendices provide fur-
ther technical details.
2 Data Sources
The data used for this analysis are similar, but not identical, to the data
we have used in previous descriptive reports published with the United Na-
tions Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)(Price
et al., 2013a,b, 2014). Four sources were used for this analysis. For more
information about each source, see Appendix A.1:
• Syrian Center for Statistics and Research (CSR-SY)
• Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies (DCHRS)
• Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)
• Violations Documentation Center (VDC).
1A small fraction of the total number of uniquely identified victims were missing suf-
ficient information to determine whether or not the killing occurred in detention. These
were taken into account in the estimate presented here through statistical imputation,
described in Section 5.
295% credible interval (13,409, 18,713)
1
For brevity, each source is referred to by its acronym throughout this
report. To integrate the four sources, we standardized the structure and
content of the different sources; for full details see Appendix A.
3 Classifying Deaths in Detention
Each of the four organizations that collected data on victims in Syria in-
clude, whenever possible, information about the circumstances of that vic-
tim’s death. This information is recorded in Arabic; we relied on Google’s
translation application programming interface to translate this information
into English.3 Two reviewers then read all of the incident details to classify
the killings as deaths that occurred while in detention. The reviewers devel-
oped a set of rules to classify killings that occurred in detention, including
if a victim is described as being:
• held by any of the regime’s forces and executed
• held by any of the regime’s forces and tortured
• arrested, detained, or kidnapped by any of the regime’s forces, even if
the body was later found outside of a detention center
• arrested, detained, tortured, or killed at one of the branches or pris-
ons specifically named in Human Rights Watch’s 2012 report “Syria:
Torture Centers Revealed”
This is a strict classification of deaths that occur in detention. In par-
ticular, a number of “field executions” were described in the records, often
of soldiers for refusing to fire. These were not considered to be deaths that
occurred in detention unless additional details specified that the victim was
arrested, imprisoned, or tortured.
In a small number of cases, details seemed to imply a killing that oc-
curred in detention, but the perpetrator(s) was (were) not identified. This
report (and the corresponding Amnesty International report “ ‘It breaks the
human’: Torture, disease and death in Syria’s prisons”) is primarily focused
on killings that occurred in state-run detention centers. Therefore, in these
cases detention status was labeled as missing and was later imputed using a
statistical model (for full details, see Section 5).
Additionally, some records lacked any information about the circum-
stances of a victim’s death. These were also treated as missing, and whether
the killing was in detention was imputed using a statistical model (for full
details, see Section 5).
3We feel confident about using this translation since our analyses over the past three
years have shown that reviewers examining the data in the original Arabic and in Google
translated English make the same decisions regarding records that refer to the same
individual. This is described in more detail in Appendix B.
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4 Record Linkage
In order to know how many deaths have been documented, we need to iden-
tify the multiple records that refer to the same individuals. These records
may be within the same list (e.g., the same source records the same victim
multiple times, perhaps because he or she was reported by multiple commu-
nity members) or across sources (e.g., different sources record information
about the same victim). The records may contain impartial and imper-
fect information, and the records contain no unique identifying number such
as a national id number. The challenge of deduplicating databases with
imperfect information arises in a variety of contexts and has been studied
across disciplines for decades. It is called “record linkage” when there are
two databases, and “database deduplication” when there are three or more.
Dunn (1946) and Newcombe et al. (1959) first formalized the problem and
Fellegi and Sunter (1969) developed some of the first theory. Winkler (2006),
Herzog et al. (2007), and Christen (2012) provide overviews of the problem
and various methods.
In our case, we begin with records of identifiable victims. An identifi-
able victim is a record that includes at least two words from the victim’s
name, plus the date and location of death. The full identifying information
is essential for the comparisons required to match records to each other.
Records lacking the complete information are considered “anonymous” and
are excluded from the analysis. The anonymous records describe victims
of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic who deserve to be acknowledged.
However, they cannot be included in this step of the analysis because it
is impossible to determine if the records with partial information refer to
killings also described by other records. That is, anonymous records cannot
be matched or de-deduplicated. Records with partial information provide
hints about the existence of killings which have not been fully documented;
estimating the number of undocumented killings is the goal of the next step
in our analysis (see Section 6).
To identify multiple records that refer to the same individual, we employ
a combination of human review and computer modeling. Humans review
subsets of records—some in the original Arabic, others in translated En-
glish4—and combine groups of records that they believe refer to the same
individual. Computer algorithms are then used to model the decisions the
humans made, to assign a probability that any two records refer to the same
individual. These probabilities are then used to cluster records into groups
that represent the information available about a single individual across all
the data sources. This is called “semi-supervised” modeling.
4We have found that these reviewers make highly comparable decisions, regardless of
the language in which they review the records. See Appendix B for details.
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4.1 Hand-Labeled Data
Although this report only considers killings that occurred while the victim
was in detention, for the record linkage part of this analysis we began with
all victims recorded by one or more of the documentation groups, regardless
of the circumstances of their death. Later, we filtered records based on the
classification described in Section 3. As a result, we begin with 413,954
total records of victims, both those killed while in detention and those killed
under other circumstances. It is important to note that this number refers to
the total number of records prior to matching and de-duplication—it should
not be inferred to indicate the total number of victims killed in the ongoing
conflict. This count includes many examples of duplicated information.
From this set of total records, we selected small groups of records with
similar names, locations, and dates of death, which a human reviewer sorted
into even smaller groups of records, called clusters, in which all the records
in each cluster refer to the same person. From these clusters we can identify
pairs of records that refer to the same person (“positive pairs” or “matches”,
of which there were 128,741 pairs) and pairs of records that do not refer
to the same person (“negative pairs” or “non-matches”, of which there were
427,638 pairs). It is useful to organize records as either clusters or sets of
pairs for various different steps in the record linkage process. These human-
labeled pairs and clusters are used to evaluate decisions in the next step
(blocking) and to train the pairwise classification model described in the
classification step.
4.2 Blocking
In order to link records that refer to the same person, we create a model that
estimates the probability that any pair of records refer to the same person.
Rather than estimate this model on the full combination of all possible pairs
(which would be approximately 85 billion pairs), we limit the consideration
to only the pairs that have a reasonable chance of being matched. This
process of limiting the analysis to a subset of pairs is called “blocking” or
“indexing.”
In brief, we consider the total number of positive pairs identified in the
hand-labeled data, looking for combinations of common field values that
define subgroups (“blocks”) within which all the positive pairs are found.5
The rules for creating these blocks are described in Figure 1 in Appendix D.
This approach covered all but 0.4% of the hand-labeled positive pairs
and generated a total of 44,448,855 pairs. This is the set of pairs that must
be considered in the remaining steps.
5For full technical details, please see this blog post.
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4.3 Feature Definition
The primary bases for comparing records are the name of the victim, and
the date and location of the death. In order to represent the similarities
and differences among records, there are many possible comparisons among
these fields, including whether the values in a field in two records are exactly
equal, or much more complicated comparisons. According to the pairwise
classification models that we have considered, the most useful comparisons
for determining matches/non-matches are:
• Given a list of all the names (in English and in Arabic), sort them
alphabetically, then calculate the number of deletions and insertions
required to transform one into the other (this is called the Jaro-Winkler
distance). This is an edit distance normalized to the length of the
string.
• Calculate the number of first, middle, and last names common to both
records divided by the total number of names in either record (this
is called the Jaccard index). Calculated for both English and Arabic
versions of the names.
• The Jaccard index for the words in the location descriptions (in Ara-
bic).
• Whether the names share substrings (measured by locality sensitive
hashing, see Rajaraman and Ullman (2011), especially chapter 3), the
first five characters, or the last five characters (in Arabic).
• The number of days between the two dates of death.
• Whether the year, month, and governorate are exactly the same.
We found a total of 32 comparisons to contribute substantially to the
probability of matching. These comparisons are the “features,” or predictor
variables, used in the pairwise classification of whether a given pair is or is
not likely to be a match.
4.4 Pairwise Classification
The hand-labeled data, both positive and negative pairs, was randomly di-
vided into two groups, one for training with 440,464 “training” pairs, and a
second group of 115,915 pairs used for testing. The training records were
given to a “gradient boosted trees” algorithm6, and the resulting model was
used to classify the testing data.
Note that the pairs in the training and testing sets are “hard.” That is,
we did not include pairs that are obviously non-matches, and many of the
6The implementation described here.
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matches are pairs with slightly different dates or names. The classification
was nonetheless quite accurate. The results of classifying the testing pairs
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Confusion Matrix for Held-Out Testing Data
model
match non-match
human match 27,510 4,521non-match 3,089 80,795
Table 1 shows that 27,510 pairs are classified by both the human reviewer
and the model as matches; these are called “true positives.” In the next cell,
4,521 pairs were classified as matches by the human reviewer but as non-
matches by the model, these are “false negatives.”
Combined, the confusion matrix creates a mean positive-negative F1
score of 0.917. Another way to evaluate a pairwise classification model is
through the calculation of a Brier score. In our case this metric suggests
that on average, the classification scores are approximately 0.23 away from
the hand-labeled values of zero (for non-match) or one (for a match).
The model was applied to the 44,448,855 pairs generated by blocking;
each pair was assigned a probability of being a match.
4.5 Clustering
Once the records are classified, we need to decide which groups of records
refer to the same person; together, the records that refer to a single person
are called a cluster. There may be one, two, or more records in a cluster.7
Our approach first partitions the records into groups via transitive clo-
sure, linking all the pairs which have even a small probability of being
matches (a classification score > 0.4) into a super-cluster, called a “con-
nected component.”
We next separate each connected component into smaller clusters which
maximize the similarity of the records to each other using a method called
“hierarchical agglomerative clustering” (HAC). 8
4.6 Merged Records
For clusters with more than one record, the information across all the records
must be merged to form a single, unified record. For a few groups of records,
this means that contradictory information from different records that refer
7See this recent blog post for additional technical aspects of clustering.
8Specifically, we use an average weighting method and a threshold-based cluster flat-
tening, with t = 0.4. This is a distance measure rather than similarity measure, so it is
slightly more strict than the threshold used in transitive closure.
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to the same person must be resolved. When there are multiple records in a
cluster with differing values, the most common (nonmissing) value for each
field is chosen; ties are broken by random selection.
5 Imputing Missing Data
After record linkage was complete, a total of 3,892 records were missing in-
formation about detention classification (as described in Section 3) because
the original raw records did not include any details about the circumstances
of death. An additional 4,766 records were also missing detention status
because the original raw records did include some details about the circum-
stances of death, but those details did not identify a perpetrator. Since this
report is concerned only with killings that occurred in state-run detention
centers, these records also must be treated as missing since we cannot con-
clude based on the information in the original record whether the perpetrator
was a representative of the state.
These records account for a small proportion of the total number of
uniquely observed victims (both those killed in detention and those killed
under other circumstances). This relatively small amount of missing data
is unlikely to have much impact on substantive conclusions, however the
statistically appropriate way to handle missing data is through imputation.
Imputation means using a statistical model to predict what the missing
values might have been, based on the values that were observed.
In this particular case we developed two different models, one for records
missing details about circumstances of death and one for records with details
but missing perpetrator information. Both were logistic regression models,
using information about the documentation pattern (whether a record was
documented by each source), date, and location of death as the predictors.
The second model, used for records missing perpetrator information,
used an additional 26 predictors describing the presence or absence of the
most frequently reported “tokens” in the phrases or sentences describing the
circumstances of death (a “token” is a single word from a string of text,
for example “arrest” or “prison”; see Appendix C for details). Both models
predicted a probability of custody status for each record missing this infor-
mation. Custody status was then drawn from a binomial distribution with
that probability.
Some of the fully observed records were held out as a test set to evaluate
the performance of these two models. Specifically, we examined how each
predicted known detention classifications. We can think of these predictions
much like the confusion matrix in Section 4, where some predictions will be
true positives, others false negatives, etc. A common measure to summarize
this information is the Area Under the Curve, or AUC. For the first model,
using only documentation pattern, date, and location of death, the AUC was
0.7. For the second model, including information about “tokens” the AUC
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was 0.99. Values closer to 1 indicate a better performing model. Perhaps not
surprisingly, when we have information about the circumstances of death,
even if perpetrator is uknown, our predictions are better, but even lacking
this information our model performs adequately.
Finally, these models were used to calculate twenty five imputed datasets,
meaning that 25 different possible versions of the set of merged records, with
complete detention classification, were calculated. MSE estimates were then
calculated for each of these 25 datasets and results were averaged across
the datasets. In this way the final MSE estimates presented in this report
account for any additional uncertainty introduced by imputation.
6 Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE)
By merging the multiple records that refer to the same individual, we create
a single list with one row for each uniquely identifiable victim. The row
contains information about which source(s) recorded information about that
victim. The number of victims documented by a single source, by each
possible combination of two sources, three sources, and all four sources,
provides insight into the size of the total victim population. In other words,
by examining the documentation patterns across the four sources, we can
learn about the only partially observed underlying population that generated
those documentation patterns. We organize this information, referred to as
“overlap patterns”, as shown in Table 2.
As noted above, missing values were imputed, creating 25 datasets on
which MSE estimates were calculated. Table 2 shows just one possible im-
putation example. Therefore the total estimate implied by this table does
not match precisely the total estimate reported in Section 1 because it is
only one of 25 possible (but very similar) estimates; the total reported in
Section 1 was averaged over all 25 imputed datasets.
A ‘1’ in a column indicates records documented by that source. For
example, the first row of Table 2 contains a ‘1’ under each source (CSR-SY,
DCHRS, SNHR, and VDC) and indicates that 1,493 records of victims killed
in detention (according to this particular imputation) were documented by
all four sources. The second row has a ‘1’ only under three of the sources
(CSR-SY, DCHRS, and VDC) and indicates that only 248 records of victims
were common across these three sources.
The goal of this step in the analysis is to estimate the last row, the num-
ber of victims that have not yet been documented by any of these sources.
Our total estimate (for this imputation) of 17,848 implies an estimate of
4,518 as yet undocumented victims.
For each imputed dataset, we calculate this estimate using a class of
methods called multiple systems estimation (MSE). MSE has been used
over the past century by ecologists (Peterson, 1894; Lincoln, 1930; Otis
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Table 2: Distribution of Records into Four Sources for One Imputation
CSR-SY DCHRS SNHR VDC Number of Records
Documented
All Four Sources
1 1 1 1 1,493
Three Out of Four Sources
1 1 0 1 248
1 0 1 1 2,599
0 1 1 1 457
1 1 1 0 301
Two Out of Four Sources
1 0 0 1 1,302
0 1 0 1 171
1 1 0 0 163
0 1 1 0 350
0 0 1 1 1,148
1 0 1 0 602
Unique to a Single Source
1 0 0 0 1,260
0 1 0 0 473
0 0 1 0 1,177
0 0 0 1 1,586
Estimated
Undocumented by All Sources
0 0 0 0 4,518
et al., 1978), demographers (Sekar and Deming, 1949), statisticians (Fien-
berg, 1972; Darroch et al., 1993; Agresti, 1994; Fienberg et al., 1999; Fienberg
and Manrique-Vallier, 2009), public health researchers (International Work-
ing Group for Disease Monitoring and Forecasting, 1995a,b), and human
rights researchers (Ball et al., 2002, 2003; Brunborg et al., 2003; Silva and
Ball, 2008; Zwierzchowski and Tabeau, 2010; Lum et al., 2010; Manrique-
Vallier et al., 2013; Lum et al., 2013; Mitchell et al., 2013) to estimate difficult
to observe populations of animals and humans. MSE includes a broad set of
mathematical models, all of which are designed to use data structured like
Table 2 and estimate the last row of unobserved information.
For this specific analysis we used the model developed in Madigan and
York (1997) as implemented in the R software package dga. In this model
the list overlap counts (as described in Table 2) are specified to follow a
multinomial distribution with a hyper-Dirichlet distribution as a prior. In
brief, this approach uses Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting et al., 1999) to
incorporate uncertainty about potential relationships between the lists.
9
7 Why This is Likely an Under-Estimate
As described in Section 3, we implemented a strict definition of killings that
occurred while a victim was in detention. As a result, a relatively small
number of observed records are used to estimate the total number of both
observed and unobserved records. Although 13,340 (the average imputed
observed total) may not seem small, Table 2 shows that most of the overlap
patterns contain relatively few records. These patterns are what we model to
estimate the unobserved number of records. The particular method that we
use is conservative in the sense that if there are too few records to produce a
meaningful estimate, the model defaults to an estimate that is closer to the
observed number of records than estimates produced by some other methods.
Additionally, although MSE methods are designed to estimate missing
data, these methods can only estimate cases where there is a non-zero prob-
ability of the death being reported. In other words, we can estimate the
number of unobserved victims killed in detention by assuming that those
victims have something in common with the victims we were able to ob-
serve. For example, we can estimate the unobserved victims who were killed
around the same time or in the same detention center as victims who were
in fact observed. We cannot estimate the number of undocumented victims
that are truly invisible to all the documentation groups. For example, vic-
tims whose families do not know they were arrested, or victims for whom
there are no community members left in Syria and who thus may have no
chance of being reported to one of our data collection partners. As a result,
there are likely more total victims than we are able to estimate.
8 The Caesar Report
In 2014 a report on Syrian detainees, commonly referred to as the Caesar
Report, was published. This report was prepared by an investigative team
“. . .mandated to determine the credibility of a defector from Syria.” In
addition to interviewing the defector, the team’s main objective was to assess
the forensic credibility of approximately 55,000 photographs smuggled out
of Syria, images which are described to show “signs of starvation, brutal
beatings, strangulation, and other forms of torture and killing.”
Although it was not their main objective, the investigative team also
drew conclusions about the total number of victims based on the num-
ber of photographs. The report describes that the team examined 5,500
photographs, but it does not describe how these photographs were selected
from the full collection of 55,000 photos. From these 5,500 photographs, the
team estimated that 1,300 distinct, individual corpses were depicted, but it
does not describe how these individuals were identified, or how photos were
matched to specific victims; this is a problem analogous to our work match-
ing multiple records to the same unique victim. From these comparisons,
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the team concludes that “. . .most deceased persons had between four or five
images taken of them,” and on this basis, they extrapolate that the 55,000,
photographs probably include approximately 11,000 individual victims.
It is possible that this many victims are depicted in this collection of
photographs, but it is impossible to assess the statistical accuracy of this
claim based on the information available. There are several statistical con-
cerns with the estimate of 11,000 victims. For the estimate to be correct,
we must assume that when images were selected for examination, all the
images relevant to each identified victim were sampled. That is, if an indi-
vidual had 6 images in the full set of 55,000 images, all 6 images must have
been chosen among the set of 5,500 images that were examined. If this is not
correct, if for example only 4 or 5 of the images of this victim were selected
for examination, then the images per victim would be underestimated.
It seems to us unlikely that each victim’s images were selected as a com-
plete set. It was likely difficult to identify victims by the images, and some
of the images relevant to each of the identified victims were likely missed
when the sample was drawn for examination. Consequently, the estimated
number of photos per victim is probably too low, and thus, the true number
of victims in the images is probably fewer than the estimated 11,000.
Until the individuals in the photographs are all positively identified, we
will not know how many victims this collection represents. The authors of
the report mention that each detainee was given two identifying numbers,
and that only the intelligence service knew the identity of the victims. If
more information about these lists of numbers were available, we might be
able to draw stronger conclusions about the likely number of victims included
in the collection.
We emphasize that we are not criticizing the substantive analysis of the
photographs, which seems to us extremely important and informative. Our
concerns are narrowly directed to the extrapolation of the total number of
victims, given the design of the examination.
9 Conclusion
Based on records collected by four organizations we identified 12,270 records
with complete information sufficient to determine that they described killings
that occurred while the victim was in detention. Using statistical imputa-
tion to infer information about records with missing or incomplete incident
details, we concluded that an average total of 13,3409 records describe vic-
tims who were killed while in detention. Applying MSE methods to these
data we estimate that a total of 17,72310 victims have been killed while in
detention, including both those whose deaths have been reported to one or
more of these sources and those whose stories have yet to be told.
9The full range of observed records across the 25 imputation datasets was from a
minimum of 13,312 to a maximum of 13,381
1095% credible interval (13,409, 18,713)
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A Data
A.1 Sources
• Syrian Center for Statistics and Research: This list was initially pro-
vided to HRDAG in November and December 2013. Subsequent up-
dates to their files were shared with HRDAG in June 2014, October
2014, May 2015, and March 2016. As described on its website, “The
center includes a local network of reporters and a team of researchers
and academics inside and outside of Syria.”
• Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies: This list was provided to
HRDAG in April 2015 and updated records were shared with HRDAG
in January and February 2016. The Damascus Center for Human
Rights Studies maintains several documentation projects in addition
to lobbying and advocating for Syrian human rights and working to
draw attention to the situation in Syria.
• Syrian Network for Human Rights: This list was initially provided to
HRDAG by OHCHR in August 2012. Beginning in February 2013,
HRDAG established a direct relationship with SNHR. SNHR con-
ducts monthly reviews of their records and subsequently updates their
dataset with newly discovered or verified victims. SNHR shared their
list and subsequent updates with HRDAG in February 2014, June
2014, October 2014, March 2015, and June 2016. SNHR maintains
a website where they describe that they “adopt the highest approved
documentation principles by the international bodies.” Also available
on their website is a description of their three phase documentation
process and the six categories of victims they document.
• Violation Documentation Centre: This list was initially provided to
HRDAG by OHCHR in February 2012. Subsequently HRDAG scraped11
the website several times between 2012 and 2016 to obtain updated
data. This process captures two of the lists maintained by VDC, “Mar-
tyrs” and “Regime fatalities.” The “About” page of their website de-
scribes the data classification methods and three-stage data verifica-
tion process implemented by the VDC.
A.2 Data Cleaning
In this step, invalid data values are filtered from the data. For example, in
many datasets the “age” variable includes a combination of ages in years as
well as specific birth years; for example, ages recorded as “1970” are clearly a
birth year rather than an age in years. These values are subtracted from the
year of death, and the difference in years is recorded as the approximate age
11Using a computer program to extract information from websites.
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of the victim. Another data cleaning task is simply removing obvious typos
from data values. For example, strings of unstructured text in otherwise
numeric or categorical variables (such as age or sex) can usually be trimmed
from those variable values.
A.3 Data Translation
In this step, key analysis variables, such as sex and governorate, are trans-
lated from Arabic to English. HRDAG’s Syrian expert (one of the native
Arabic speakers who review records) confirms the translation of these values.
Other Arabic content, such as names and locations (a finer geographic de-
scription than governorate) are reviewed in their original form by the native
Arabic speaking reviewers.
For other reviewers, HRDAG uses Google’s translation application pro-
gramming interface to translate names and locations, which they then review
in English. Close comparison of these decisions to those made by the native
Arabic speakers confirm a high level of consistency, regardless of whether
review is conducted in English or Arabic. For full details, see the section on
inter-rater reliability in Appendix B.
A.4 Data Canonicalization
In this step, analysis variables are transformed to have a common structure
across all of the data sources. For example, the different datasets collect
a variety of information about the location of death. These locations may
be recorded across numerous variables and in varying levels of precision
(e.g., neighborhood, area, governorate). HRDAG matches records based on
governorate and compares results for different governorates, so the location
variable must be standardized across data sources. In some cases, this is
straightforward, in some cases HRDAG uses other location information (such
as city) to map to governorate.
B Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR)
When two or more individuals review and code data, such as the reviewers
employed by HRDAG to determined whether multiple records refer to the
same individual, it is common to need to assess the consistency of the deci-
sions made by those individuals. Formally, this assessment is referred to as
inter-rater reliability (IRR) and is generally described using the overall per-
cent agreement among coders and a kappa coefficient. There are a variety
of other statistical measures to evaluate IRR, but kappa is commonly used
for categorical measures, such as assigning match/non-match to groups of
records.
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First, the overall agreement rate is the proportion of times that multiple
coders make the same decision. For example, for this project coders A and B
each reviewed the same 63,249 pairs of records (coder A in English, coder B
in Arabic) with overall agreement 96%. Coders B and C each reviewed the
same 63,951 pairs of records (both working in Arabic) with overall agreement
95.4%. Finally, coders A (English) and C (Arabic) each reviewed the same
86,371 pairs of records, with overall agreement 94.7%.
Second, kappa is calculated as this agreement, adjusted to consider the
amount of agreement that might be expected by chance. Specifically:
κ =
pa − pc
1− pc
where pa is the overall agreement and pc is the amount of agreement
expected by chance. pc is calculated from the total number of matches and
non-matches assigned by each coder. For the same combinations of coders
described above, coders A and B have a kappa value of 0.813, B and C a
value of 0.817, and A and C a value of 0.796.
In general, a kappa above 0.8 is considered very good, 0.6-0.8 is good,
and 0.4-0.6 is considered moderate. For more about kappa, see Gwet (2012)
or Hallgren (2012).
Perhaps even more important than the raw percent agreement and kappa
values is the consistency of those values regardless of whether the coders
being compared are both working in Arabic or one is working in English and
the other Arabic. These results imply that the decisions made by each of the
reviewers are highly consistent, regardless of whether they were reviewing
the records with the original Arabic content or translated into English.
C Incident Detail Tokens
For the imputation described in Section 5 we needed to summarize the con-
tent contained in the incident details field, and particularly the relationship
between that content and whether or not a record was likely to be catego-
rized as describing a killing that occurred in detention. The incident details
field is an unstructured text field, meaning that it contains descriptions in
phrases, sentences, or, in a few cases, paragraphs. We split this text into
separate words, then counted the frequency with which each word appeared
among records that were coded during the hand-review as a killing that
occurred in detention (“Y”) or not (“N”).
Perhaps not surprisingly, among those records that described a killing
that occured in detention, some of the most frequently appearing words
included “torture”, “prison(s)”, and “arrest”. Among those that were not cat-
egorized as killings that occurred in detention, some of the most frequently
appearing words included “clashes”, “shelling”, and “bombardment”. After
removing uninformative common words, such as “a”, “an”, “the,” we identi-
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fied 16 words (tokens) strongly associated with records coded as “N” and 10
words strongly associated with records coded as “Y”. Indicators for whether
or not each of these 26 tokens were present in the details field were used as
predictors in the second logistic regression model described in Section 5.
D Blocking Rules
The full set of rules mentioned in Section 4.2 are:
(name_last5 ∧ name_meta_first ∧ yearmo) ∪
(governorate ∧ name_en_meta_first ∧ yearmo) ∪
(sortedname_en_first5 ∧ name_en_meta_last ∧
sortedname_en_meta_last) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ name_first5 ∧ name_meta_last) ∪
(name_en_last4 ∧ yearqtr ∧ reg) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ sortedname_meta_first ∧ sortedname_en_meta_last) ∪
(name_last5 ∧ name_en_meta_first ∧ reg) ∪
(sex ∧ date_of_death ∧ sortedname_en_first5) ∪
(sortedname_en_last5 ∧ name_en_no_mo_lsh ∧ yearmo) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ sortedname_last5 ∧ reg) ∪
(sex ∧ date_of_death ∧ location) ∪
(location ∧ sortedname_en_meta_last ∧ year) ∪
(sortedname_last5 ∧ sortedname_en_first5 ∧ yearmo) ∪
(name_first5 ∧ name_en_meta_last ∧ yearsem) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ name_en_meta_first ∧ reg) ∪
(name_en_last4 ∧ name_en_meta_first ∧ sortedname_en_meta_last) ∪
(governorate ∧ name_last5 ∧ sortedname_last5) ∪
(sortedname_first5 ∧ sortedname_en_meta_last ∧ yearmo) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ governorate ∧ sortedname_lsh) ∪
(location ∧ sortedname_en_first5 ∧ yearqtr) ∪
(age ∧ governorate ∧ name_first5) ∪
(governorate ∧ sortedname_en_last5 ∧ yearqtr) ∪
(location ∧ sortedname_last5 ∧ yearmo) ∪
(sortedname_en_last5 ∧ name_en_meta_first ∧ yearmo) ∪
(age ∧ sortedname_first5 ∧ yearsem) ∪
(location ∧ sortedname_first5 ∧ name_en_first4) ∪
(name_en_first4 ∧ name_en_meta_last ∧ yearmo) ∪
(sex ∧ sortedname ∧ name_first5) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ name_en_meta_last ∧ sortedname_lsh) ∪
(date_of_death ∧ name_en_first4 ∧ name_lsh) ∪
(location ∧ name_en_first4 ∧ name_en_last4) ∪
(location ∧ sortedname_first5 ∧ yearmo) ∪
(age_group ∧ name_en_first4 ∧ name_en_last4)
Figure 1: Blocking Rules
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